《上市公司股权再融资研究》(管征)--中国社会科学院金融研究所

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《上市公司股权再融资研究》(管征)

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管征，男，1964年生于江苏南京；1986年、1999年、2004年分别于南京邮电大学、南京大学商学院获得工学学士、经济学硕士和经济学博士学位。主要研究领域为货币金融、公司金融和资本市场。已出版专著2部。先后在报刊上发表论文十余篇。

内容摘要

　　经研究表明：美国等国家上市公司已经很少采用股权再融资方式筹集资金，1984年起，美国上市公司已普遍停止通过发行股票来融资，而是大量回购自己的股份。大量理论分析和实证研究也表明，上市公司采用股权再融资方式筹集资金对公司的价值有负面影响，但是，除美国以外的其它国家仍然采用股权再融资方式筹集资金；对于上市公司股权再融资方式选择问题，在美国，1930-1950年间配股方式是其主要的股权再融资方式，从1970年开始，配股方式逐渐消失，取而代之的是增发方式，但是,加拿大、欧洲和亚洲大部分地区却仍是以配股方式作为主要的股权再融资方式，他们较少采用增发方式。以上两个现象可以称之为“上市公司股权再融资之谜”，而目前中国上市公司呈现的特有的强烈的股权再融资偏好及增发偏好现象，可以称之为“中国上市公司股权再融资之谜”。本文试图运用现代再融资理论及相应的实证研究方法，对“上市公司股权再融资之谜”，以及“中国上市公司股权再融资之谜”进行一个较为全面的研究，以期解开“中国上市公司股权再融资之谜”。

　　本文首先就上市公司再融资理论和股权再融资方式选择理论进行了回顾和总结。上市公司再融资理论认为，上市公司应该避免采用股权再融资方式进行资金筹集，而应该考虑采用其它方式，比如内源再融资、债权再融资等；上市公司股权再融资方式选择理论认为，上市公司是如何选择配股还是增发方式进行股权再融资至今仍是个“谜”，它需要根据具体的地区、国情和公司特征等才能做出合理选择。

　　要研究中国上市公司股权再融资行为，就要对中国上市公司再融资的总体状况有一个全面的了解。首先，我们回顾了我国股权再融资政策及其演变过程，本文详细地阐述了我国配股和增发政策的演变过程，表明我国上市公司再融资政策发展到今天，是中国证券监督管理部门及其他相关政府部门根据市场实际情况，经过多次修正和不断完善的结果。其次，我们对我国再融资现状进行了描述。随着我国证券市场的大规模发展，为我国上市公司进行再融资创造了极其重要的途径和场所。从总体看，自1990年至2003年底我国上市公司在我国证券市场融资共计8026.93亿元(不包括在海外的融资)，而上市公司再融资(配股、增发和可转换债券)却高达3256.05亿元，占总融资额的40.56%，其中再融资中配股和增发方式占91.84%，且上市公司的资产负债率基本稳定在50%，这些都表明我国上市公司有着强烈的股权再融资偏好；从再融资方式看，1998年前由于政策原因我国只有配股方式，1998年开始才逐步推广增发方式、可转换债券方式。据统计自1990年至2003年底共实施了967次配股，筹集资金2217.96亿元，95次增发，筹集资金772.49亿元，显示我国上市公司有配股偏好。但是，如果我们剔除政策因素，进一步分析发现我国上市公司实际上表现为增发偏好；从发展阶段看，可以分为三个阶段：起步阶段--1998年5月以前、初步发展阶段--1998年5月至2001年3月和市场化阶段--2001年3月至今。最后，同国外的再融资情况比较表明：从上市公司外部融资看，G-7国家的融资是基本符合啄食顺序理论，而我国上市公司融资行为的总体特征，扣除当年股权融资为零的样本后，其外部融资达到75%，而外部融资中股权融资达到76%，呈现强烈的股权融资偏好；从股权再融资方式看，并无规律可寻，美国、日本及香港等偏爱增发方式，而加拿大、法国、英国等欧洲国家喜欢采用配股方式。

　　在上述研究的基础上，对“上市公司股权再融资之谜”，及“中国上市公司股权再融资之谜”进行全面分析。首先，对上市公司采用股权再融资筹集资金进行理论上探究，并结合中国的实际针对中国上市公司呈现的强烈的股权再融资偏好进行理论分析和实证检验；然后，对上市公司股权再融资方式的合理选择进行理论分析，同时结合中国实情进行修正，得出中国上市公司进行股权再融资方式选择模型，并对此进行实证检验。

　　大量的理论和实证文献表明，上市公司采用股权再融资方式筹集资金对公司价值有负面影响，上市公司应该避免采用股权再融资方式，但现实中仍有不少上市公司采用它，尤其在中国还呈现强烈的股权再融资偏好，这表明股权再融资的存在有它的内因。因此，要研究“上市公司股权再融资之谜”，首先必须研究它存在的理论依据。本文从三个方面对上市公司股权再融资偏好进行了理论分析，第一，应用信息经济学理论，从信息不对称角度分析上市公司股权再融资现象，理论分析结论为：由信息不对称而产生的“逆向选择”和“道德风险”给上市公司采用股权再融资方式寻找到充分的理由，尽管这将对上市公司的价值造成损害。“逆向选择”使得市场上价值低于平均水平的以及拥有坏项目的上市公司，十分愿意通过股权再融资为他们的新项目筹集资金；“道德风险”则使得上市公司管理者为获得高额的道德风险收益，他们会极尽所能地去让上市公司采用股权再融资筹集资金。而在我国，特殊的股权分置制度及更加严重的信息不对称，使得我国上市公司实施股权再融资的区间巨大，以至于即使存在债权再融资机会，他们也会选择股权再融资；同时公司治理的不健全，上市公司管理者当然会尽可能地进行股权再融资，以通过“败德”行为攫取道德风险收益。因此，严重的信息不对称导致我国出现上市公司股权再融资偏好现象。第二，应用自由现金流量理论，从自由现金流量角度分析股权再融资现象，理论分析结论为：由于现实中上市公司管理者在公司股份中只占有很少的比例，因此，上市公司管理者更注重非货币利益的获取，为了获取更多的非货币利益，他们更倾向于采用股权再融资，因为采用股权再融资一方面可以进一步降低其在公司中股份的比例，另一方面可以获得更多的自由现金，且不受类似债权融资的“硬约束”限制。在中国情况更加严重，我国的上市公司大部分是由国有企业改造而来，所以我国上市公司管理者基本上是由政府部门委派或任命的。因此，我国上市公司管理者基本上不持有上市公司的股份。在这种情况下，我国上市公司的管理者们，不能按比例获得公司利润，只能靠获取非货币收益来分享好的投资项目带来的收益，这就造成我国上市公司管理者与流通股东之间的冲突更加严重，公司管理者们当然希望无限制进行股权再融资以获取最大的自由现金流量，实现其最大的非货币收益，以达到个人利益最大化。因此，自由现金流量理论为中国出现的特有的上市公司股权再融资偏好找到理论依据。第三，应用行为金融学理论，从非理性和“时机窗口“角度分析股权再融资偏好现象，理论分析结论为：市场的非效率和投资者的非理性必然造成股票价格的波动，从而给上市公司管理者创造了进行股权再融资的“时机窗口”。他们总是充分利用“时机窗口”在其股票价格被市场高估的时候，发行股票进行股权再融资；而当其股票价格被市场低估的时候，发行债券进行债权再融资，并回购其股票。中国的实情是，中国证券市场是只有十几年历史的新兴市场，交易制度的不健全导致至今还没有做空机制，这就使得在中国市场上还没有真正意思上的套利者；中国市场上特有的股权割裂现象，造成了具有绝对控股权的非流通股股东随意侵占流通股股东的利益，使得中国上市公司很少甚至不分配红利；中国投资者心态也极不成熟，他们基本上都在追求股票买卖时产生的差价。种种理由表明，中国证券市场非理性程度更加严重，噪音交易者泛滥，股票价格波动剧烈。这种情况下，上市公司管理者利用如此有利的“时机窗口”进行股权再融资是无可非议的。因此，严重的非理性行为造成我国上市公司强烈的股权再融资偏好。最后，用中国市场数据进行实证检验，结果表明：在中国上市公司实施股权再融资确实对公司的长期业绩产生负面影响，信息不对称理论、自由现金流量理论和时机窗口理论对中国市场都有解释力，其中时机窗口理论对长期具有解释力，自由现金流量理论对中期具有解释力，信息不对称理论解释力最差。

　　上市公司在确定采用股权再融资后，将面临股权再融资具体方式选择问题。目前上市公司进行股权再融资的方式主要有两种：增发和配股。国外学者在研究上市公司如何选择股权再融资方式最佳时发现，采用增发方式比采用配股方式的发行成本高，从股东利益最大化观点看，上市公司应当采用配股方式发行新股；但是，进一步研究又发现配股方式再融资会损害公司价值，而增发方式将增加公司价值,因此,如何选择最佳至今仍是个“谜”。本文从两个方面对上市公司股权再融资方式选择进行了理论分析，第一，从信息不对称角度研究股权再融资方式的选择。在Wu和Wang（2002）模型基础上进一步分析得出中国市场模型表明：在我国目前上市公司股权割裂等特殊背景下，增发方式和配股方式都是上市公司管理者追求的目标，但相对而言增发方式是最优选择，因为他们获取了最大化的私人收益。但是，对外部投资者来说，则是最差选择，因为这样选择对上市公司价值损害最大，因此，从提高整个市场效率和保护外部投资者利益（特别是中小投资者）来看，相比而言还是应该提倡选择配股方式进行股权再融资。第二，从财富再分配角度研究股权再融资方式选择问题，研究结果表明：采用配股方式对老股东财富的理论损失是零，应该是公司管理者首选的股权再融资方式；而增发方式将使得老股东的财富转移给新股东，造成老股东财富的损失。按照Myers 和 Majluf（1984）观点：公司管理者的目标是现有股东利益真实价值最大化，因此，上市公司管理者应避免采用增发方式。但对于中国目前特殊的股权割裂现状，即存在占绝对控股的非流通股和少数流通股，由此得出其结论为：对于非流通股股东而言，增发方式最有利，且增发价格越高，其财富增值就越大；非流通股股本比例越高，其财富增值越大。而在由非流通股股东控制的股东大会上，当然会通过增发议案，而且倾向于增发价格尽可能定高。但是对于外部流通股股东而言，其财富损失就越大，如果按这种情况任其发展，外部流通股股东将不得不选择“用脚投票”，这将使得上市公司通过证券市场进行股权再融资行为无法实现，证券市场失去筹资功能，因而从均衡证券市场各方利益来说，在中国应该提倡上市公司选择配股发行方式进行股权再融资。最后，我们用中国市场的数据进行实证检验，结果表明：中国上市公司配股和增发的公告效应均显著为负，证明了流通股股东更加拒绝增发方式；实施增发方式的上市公司高达67.05%的净资产收益率，比配股方式高出37.26%，表明中国上市公司管理者一定偏好增发方式，验证了理论上的结论；我国上市公司股权再融资方式选择的决定因素主要有：上市公司的规模、流通股比例和市盈率。

第一章导论

　　一、问题的提出

　　二、基本概念界定

　　三、研究思路和框架体系

　　四、研究的工具和方法

　　五、可能的创新、不足与困难

第二章上市公司再融资理论回顾及评述

　　一、公司融资理论回顾

　　二、上市公司再融资理论

　　三、上市公司股权再融资方式选择理论

第三章中国上市公司股权再融资现状及国际比较

　　一、中国上市公司股权再融资政策及演变过程

　　二、中国上市公司股权再融资现状

　　三、上市公司股权再融资方式国际比较

第四章上市公司股权再融资偏好：理论与实证研究

　　一、上市公司股权再融资研究现状

　　二、信息不对称与上市公司股权再融资偏好

　　三、自由现金流量理论与上市公司股权再融资偏好

　　四、时机窗口理论与上市公司股权再融资偏好

　　五、实证检验

第五章上市公司股权再融资方式选择：理论研究

　　一、上市公司股权再融资方式选择研究现状

　　二、不对称信息下的股权再融资方式选择

　　三、财富再分配效应与股权再融资选择

第六章中国上市公司股权再融资方式选择：实证研究

　　一、样本数据

　　二、中国市场配股和增发方式的公告效应实证研究

　　三、中国市场股权再融资方式选择的决定因素

　　四、股权再融资发行方式对上市公司的影响

第七章结论及政策建议

　　一、基本结论

　　二、政策建议

附录

参考文献

Abstract

　　Many researchers show that in USA seasoned equity offering (SEO) is seldom adopted to raise fund. Since 1984, most of American listed companies have stopped doing that; instead they choose to repurchase their shares in large quantities. Though many theoretical and empirical analyses show that the SEO has negative effect on corporate value, it does exist ubiquitously in many countries. Concerning about the modes of SEO, in America, the rights offering (RO) is popular during the period of 1930-1950, but since 1970 RO disappears little by little and the additional stock issuance (ASI) appears. However, it is quite different in Canada, Europe and most of Asia where the RO is still dominant and ASI is rarely taken. All these can be summarized as the Puzzle of SEO. Now in China most public companies have very strong preference for SEO especially through ASI, which can be described as the Puzzle of Chinese SEO. In this dissertation, I try to investigate and explain these two puzzles theoretically or empirically.

　　Firstly, I study some previous literatures on the SEO. Generally speaking, most researchers maintain that the listed companies should resort to other financing channels. And most of them still wonder how the companies make their choices between the RO and ASI.

　　Before my analysis, it is necessary to learn the whole situation thoroughly. Out of this I start with the description of the policy changes on the Chinese SEO and its two modes. After these work I find that these policy changes are usually induced by the amendments and adjustments of the authorities because they have to gaze at the real-time change of the market. Then I depict the SEO actuality in our country and find that it is the rapid development of the securities business that produces the preconditions for the SEO. By the end of 2003, the public companies have obtained 802.693 billion Yuan in the market (the money got from overseas excluded), and the money financed by SEO account for 40.56%, reaching to 325.605 billion Yuan, among which the money from RO and ASI occupies 91.84%. And most companies have a stable liability/asset ratio of 50%. All these suggest strong preference for SEO among the listed companies in China. Moreover, I find that before 1998 RO is the only method due to certain policies, while after 1998 the additional stock and convertible bond are introduced in. According to the statistics, from 1990 to 2003 there are 967 ROs and 95 ASIs through which the companies got 221.796 billion Yuan and 77.249 billion Yuan respectively. Thus I can conclude that in China the listed companies prefer RO to ASI. But when the policy factor is eliminated, I get a quite different result. In fact the development of capital market can be divided into three stages which are the start-up stage (before May 1998), the early stage (from March 1998 to March 2001) and the market-oriented stage (after March 2001). Finally by comparing to other countries, I find that the pecking order theory fits well in the G-7 countries. While in China, if we take out those who doesn’t raise fund, among the money raised by the listed companies, 75% are external, and among the external money, 76% are financed by stocks, which means that the Chinese listed companies have very strong preference for equity financing. But as to the SEO mode, there is no particular rule. The RO is favored by the Canadian, French and English companies, while the American, Japanese and Hong Kong companies have a predilection for the ASI.

　　The second part of my paper is a detailed analysis on the two Puzzles. In this part, I try to find some theoretical and empirical explanation for companies’ strong preference for SEO in China. Then I analyze the mode choice and establish a model to test my suppositions empirically.

　　Though many scholars show that the SEO should be avoided because of its negative effect on corporate value, it is still favored by many companies especially in China. This means that there must be some intrinsic factors for the SEO, which is just what I am supposed to find out. To research the Puzzle of SEO, some theoretical explanation is absolutely necessary. Firstly I borrow some theory of information economics and my conclusion is that the adverse selection and moral hazard problem caused by the asymmetric information is an important reason for the SEO though it may hurt the corporate value. The adverse selection problem encourages the public companies whose market value is below the average and who has bad projects to raise money through SEO for their new projects; the moral hazard problem makes it possible for the managers to benefit from the SEO. In China, we have more severe asymmetric information problems and the shares are separated as tradable and non-tradable shares, so it is more possible for the public companies to raise fund by SEO. As a result, the companies will try hard to use SEO even if they have other financing channels. At the same time, the managers will make the most this opportunity because they can benefit from the SEO. Consequently, the severe asymmetric information problem is partly responsible for the SEO preference in our country. Additionally, I use the free cash flow theory to investigate this SEO phenomenon. As in real life the proportions of shares the managers have are very low, they are tempted to use SEO to raise fund in order to get more non-monetary advantages. When they take SEO, they can lower their shares they hold, get more free cash and avoid the hard constraint from bonds at the same while. In China, this problem is even more serious because most public companies are altered from the State-owned enterprises and most managers are sent by the government, who has hardly any shares which means they have no access to the dividend. Therefore they resort to the SEO to maximize their self-interest. Moreover, I use the irrationality and window of opportunity theory in behavioral finance to research the SEO. My deduction is that the inefficiency of the market and the irrationality of the investors cause the stock price to fluctuate which makes it the window of opportunity for the managers. That is to say when the stock price is over-estimated by the market, the managers will issue seasoned equity; when the price is under-estimated, they will issue bond and buyback their stocks. While in our country, the emerging Chinese securities business lacks some necessary institutions for the real arbitrators to appear. In addition to that, in China the shares are separated, this makes the non-tradable shareholders who in fact control the company definitely have the opportunity to misappropriate the benefit of the tradable shareholders, which makes the Chinese public companies seldom or hardly distribute. At the same time, the mind of the investors may need adjustment because most of them seek the price difference only. All these show that the irrationality of Chinese securities business is even worse, the noise traders are inundant and the price fluctuates drastically. Under this circumstance, it is no wonder that the managers will make use of the window of opportunity to issue seasoned equity. Finally, I use some Chinese data to do some empirical test. The result shows that even in China the SEO has negative effect on the long performance of companies. All the asymmetric information theory, free cash flow theory and opportunity window theory can explain the SEO to some extent. But when we discuss it in a long horizon, the opportunity window theory fits best, and when we talk about it in a medium horizon, the free cash flow theory fits best while the asymmetric information theory fits worst.

　　When the companies decide to use SEO, they have to choose between RO and ASI. Some foreign scholars find that ASI costs more than RO does. Therefore according to the shareholder max theory, the RO should be taken. But this mode may hurt the corporate value while the ASI may increase it. So which mode to choose is still a puzzle. In this paper, I try to discuss it from two angles. Firstly, I try to study it in the framework of asymmetric information. Out of this, I establish my own model on the base of Wu and Wang’s (2002), and the model suggests that given separated shares, both the ASI and RO are pursued by the public companies. But people usually prefer the former because they can obtain max private interest. On the contrary, it is the worst choice for the external investors because it damages corporate value most. Therefore, in order to improve the whole efficiency and protect the external investors, the RO should be chosen. After that I turn to the angle of wealth redistribution and find that the RO should be the first choice because it will do no harm to the existing shareholders. Contrarily, the ASI may transfer some wealth of the existing shareholders to the new shareholders. According to Myers and Majluf (1984), the managers should avoid using the ASI in order to maximize the benefit of existing shareholders. But in China, some non-tradable stock holders are the real controllers. To issue additional stock can do them good. And the higher the price is, the more the wealth increases. The more the non-tradable stock is, the more the wealth increases. And since the shareholder meeting is actually controlled by the non-tradable shareholders, it will certainly sanction the proposal to issue additional stocks. And it is quite possible that the price is very high. But this will definitely harm the wealth of the external tradable shareholders. Then they have to vote with foot, which will make it impossible for the public companies to use SEO and the market will lose its function in financing. In this sense, we should advocate the RO to raise fund. In the final place I do some empirical test with some data in the Chinese market. And the result is that the announcement effect of the rights offering and additional stock issuance are obvious negative. This testifies why the tradable shareholders reject additional stock issuance. My empirical analysis also shows that the net return on equity of those companies who issue additional stocks is as high as 67.05%, which is higher than those who use RO by 37.26%. In conclusion, the scale, the proportion of circulation shares and the price/earning ratio are all determinants for the public companies when they use SEO.

CONTENTS

Chapter One: Introduction

Chapter Two: Literature Review on SEO

Chapter 3: Present situation of SEO in China

Chapter Four: Research on the preference for SEO of the listed companies

Chapter Five: Theoretical analysis on the SEO modes choice

Chapter Six: Empirical research on the SEO modes choice of Chinese companies

Chapter Seven: Conclusions and Suggestions

Appendixes

References

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